2017. Aesthetic Values in Science. Philosophy Compass. Preprint.
Abstract
Scientists often use aesthetic values in the evaluation and choice of theories.
Aesthetic values are not only regarded as leading to practically more useful
theories, but are often taken to be indicators of the truth of a theory. This paper
explores what aesthetic considerations influence scientists’ reasoning, how such
aesthetic values relate to the utility of a scientific theory, and how one can
justify the epistemic role for such values. The paper examines ways in which the
link between beauty and truth can be defended, the challenges facing such
accounts, and explores alternative epistemic roles for aesthetic values in
scientific practice.
2017. Poincaré's Aesthetics of Science. Synthese. Preprint.
Abstract
This paper offers a systematic analysis of Poincaré’s
understanding of beauty in science. In particular,
the paper examines the epistemic significance Poincaré
attributes to aesthetic judgement by reconstructing and
analysing his arguments on simplicity and unity in science.
I offer a consistent reconstruction of Poincaré’s account
and show that for Poincaré simplicity and unity are
regulative principles, linked to the aim of science – that
of achieving understanding of how phenomena relate. I show
how Poincaré’s account of beauty in science can be incorporated
within his wider philosophy of science.
2017. Virtues
and Vices in Scientific Practice. Synthese. [With C. Paternotte.]
Abstract
The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant
discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored
the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show
whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory
choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful
resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices in
scientific inquiry and their beneficial effects in the context of theory choice.
We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories
and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal
social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary
nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate
successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations.
2015. Conventionalism
about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Preprint.
Abstract
This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem's and Poincaré's
views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After
analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed
to them --- in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem
and the epistemological status of certain principles --- I show that neither
Duhem's nor Poincaré's arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue
that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory
choice, differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status
of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially
different.
2015.
Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. Preprint.
Abstract
Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism.
However, the relationship between these two theses and their place
in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper
I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in
Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue
that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made
possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements,
which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his
geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and
defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends
a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and
conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes
epistemic access to mind-independent structures.
2015. Conventional Principles in Science: On
the foundations and development of the relativized a priori. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
[With M. Farr.] Preprint.
2013.
Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social
Consensus. Erkenntnis.
[With C. Paternotte.]
Preprint.
Abstract
There has been a significant interest in the recent literature
in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which
is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than
rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good
sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes
to good sense in different contexts, before examining its
current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their
limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense,
seen as promoting social consensus in science, and show that it
is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful
to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that
virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social
consensus account against objections that highlight the positive
role of diversity and division of labour in science.
2013. Did Perrin's Experiments Convert Poincaré to Scientific
Realism?. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of
Science. Preprint.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom
does not indicate a shift from instrumentalism to scientific
realism. I examine the implications of Poincaré’s acceptance
of the existence of the atom for our current understanding
of his philosophy of science. Specifically, how can we
understand Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom in structural
realist terms? I examine his 1912 paper carefully and suggest
that it does not entail scientific realism in the sense of
acceptance of the fundamental existence of atoms but rather,
argues against fundamental entities. I argue that Poincaré’s
paper motivates a non-fundamentalist view about the world,
and that this is compatible with his structuralism.
2011.
‘Good Sense’ in Context: A Response to Kidd. Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science.
Abstract
In his response to my (2010), Ian Kidd claims that my argument
against Stump’s interpretation of Duhem’s concept of ‘good sense’
is unsound because it ignores an important distinction within
virtue epistemology. In light of the distinction between
reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology, Kidd argues
that Duhem can be seen as supporting the latter, which he further
illustrates with a discussion of Duhem’s argument against ‘perfect
theory’. I argue that no substantive argument is offered to show
that the distinction is relevant and can establish that Duhem’s
‘good sense’ can be understood within responsibilist virtue
epistemology. I furthermore demonstrate that Kidd’s attempt to
support his contention relies on a crucial misreading of Duhem’s
general philosophy of science, and in doing so highlight the
importance of understanding ‘good sense’ in its original context,
that of theory choice.
2011. Friedman's Relativized A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search
of Compatibility. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Preprint.
Abstract
In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur,
who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman’s relativised
a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided
by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to
show that the conjunction of Friedman’s relativised a priori with
structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of
irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman’s view
and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of
McArthur’s argument. This compatibility is usually questioned,
due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman’s view, which clashes with
the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that
structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and
as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman’s view, but more
importantly I question whether Friedman’s view really implies mind
dependence.
2010. Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.
Preprint.
Abstract
This paper examines Duhem’s concept of good sense as an attempt to
support a non rule-governed account of rationality in theory choice.
Faced with the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis and
the continuity thesis, Duhem tried to account for the ability of
scientists to choose theories that continuously grow to a natural
classification. I will examine the concept of good sense and the
problems that stem from it. I will also present a recent attempt by
David Stump to link good sense to virtue epistemology. I will argue
that even though this approach can be useful for the better
comprehension of the concept of good sense, there are some
substantial differences between virtue epistemologists and Duhem.
In the light of this reconstruction of good sense, I will propose
a possible way to interpret the concept of good sense, which
overcomes the noted problems and fits better with Duhem’s views on
scientific method and motivation in developing the concept of good
sense.
Forthcoming. Beauty, Truth and Understanding.
The Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding, ed. Steven French and Milena Ivanova.
Abstract
Many scientific theories have been praised for their aesthetic qualities. Newtonian mechanics, Einstein’s theory of relativity are given as examples of a beautiful theory. The beauty of scientific theories is often used in the evaluation of their likelihood of being true or in the estimation of their expected empirical success. That is, often scientists place epistemic import on the aesthetic values of theories, deciding whether to commit to a theory in light of its aesthetic appeal, especially in situations when sufficient empirical data is not available to guide such a decision. The question then arises whether we can trust aesthetic considerations to be playing an epistemic role in science and informing our attitudes towards scientific theories.
In this chapter I outline accounts that have defended the epistemic role for beauty and aesthetic values in science, claiming that there is a link between an aesthetically appealing theory and its likelihood to be true. After challenging the plausibility of these accounts, I turn to an alternative defence for the relevance and importance of aesthetic considerations in science. It is argued that science has many goals, truth and empirical success being the usual favourites, but it also aims at offering understanding of phenomena and such understanding can be achieved in the absence of truth. By focusing on the concept of understanding, I argue that aesthetic factors are intricately linked to our own cognitive make up and desire to understand the world around us, shaping our inferential patterns and guiding the construction and acceptance of scientific theories.
Forthcoming. Theory Virtues and Acceptance.
In Lauener Series in Philosophy dedicated to Bas van Fraassen’s contribution to philosophy of science, ed. Michael Frauchiger.
Abstract
Trusting a theory involves several considerations that can go beyond the empirical adequacy of the theory. When scientists form their epistemic attitudes towards a theory, they look for empirical and logical considerations: is the theory making successful predictions; does it predict beyond its intended domain; is it internally consistent? But one’s attitude towards a theory is also formed by considerations that go beyond logic and experience, by considering extra-empirical, often also called aesthetic, criteria such as the theory’s elegance, unity, coherence, simplicity. These virtues of the theory often dictate theory choice, especially when the data is not available to conclusively support one theory. But what role exactly do these virtues play in our choices? Do they help us choose the most convenient theory, or can we claim that a theory that satisfies a list of such aesthetic properties is more likely to be true? In this chapter I discuss several strategies developed by scientific realists to argue in favour of an epistemic understanding of theory virtues. These arguments aim to support the idea that there is a special epistemic relationship between the virtues of a theory and its likelihood of being true. Instrumentalists, positivists and constructive empiricists have long opposed this idea, with Bas van Fraassen presenting a challenge to the epistemic take on virtues. I will discuss three strategies that have been developed to defend the epistemic significance of theory virtues, present some problems for these accounts, and return to van Fraassen’s focus on agency and pragmatics in theory choice, offering further support to the pragmatic understanding of theory virtues.
Forthcoming. Henri Poincaré.
Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers.
Abstract
Forthcoming. Methods in Science and Metaphysics. [With M. Farr.]
Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, ed. James Miller and Ricki Bliss.
Abstract
While science is taken to differ from non-scientific activities by its method,
metaphysics is usually defined by its subject matter. However, many traditional
questions of metaphysics are addressed in a variety of ways by science, making
it difficult to demarcate metaphysics from science solely in terms of their
subject matter. Are the methodologies of science and metaphysics sufficiently
distinct to act as criteria of demarcation between the two? In this chapter we
focus on several important overlaps in the methodologies used within science
and metaphysics in order to argue that focusing solely on methodology is
insufficient to offer a sharp demarcation between metaphysics and science,
and consider the consequences of this for the wider relationship between
science and metaphysics.
This paper challenges the appeal to theory virtues
in theory choice as well as the appeal to the intellectual
and moral virtues of an agent as determining unique choices
between empirically equivalent theories. After arguing that
theoretical virtues do not determine the choice of one theory
at the expense of another theory, I argue that nor does the
appeal to intellectual and moral virtues single out one agent,
who defends a particular theory, and exclude another agent
defending an alternative theory. I analyse Duhem’s concept of
good sense and its recent interpretation in terms of virtue
epistemology. I argue that the virtue epistemological interpretation
does not show how good sense leads to conclusive choices and
scientific progress.
