Milena Ivanova | Philosophy of Science

Department of History and Philosophy of Science | University of Cambridge

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About Me

I am a philosopher working on topics in the metaphysics and epistemology of science. I'm currently a Teaching Associate in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. I received my doctoral degree in 2013 from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. My thesis, Realism, Conventionalism and Theory Choice, was supervised by James Ladyman and examined by Michael Friedman and Samir Okasha. My doctoral research was funded by the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (2009-2011) and the Royal Institute of Philosophy (2011-2012). Between 2013-2014, I was a lecturer in the Unit for History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Sydney. Between 2015-2017 I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy and a visiting research fellow at the University of Queensland.

Research

My work falls within the scope of philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. Particularly, I am interested in the scientific realism debate, the development of conventionalism and pragmatism and the role of non-empirical factors in scientific reasoning. My current research addresses two epistemological issues in philosophy of science: (1) the nature of scientific principles; and (2) the role of non-empirical values in science. My work is informed by the history of philosophy of science, especially the relationship between science and philosophy in the early twentieth century.
+ read more about my current research

My current work covers three main issues.

1. Constitutive principles and scientific realism. My work addresses the question of whether scientific principles, such as Newton’s laws of motion and the equivalence principle in general relativity, are purely empirical, conventional, or a priori in nature. While we generally accept that science is concerned with empirically testable claims, some statements in scientific theories appear to have a special epistemic status and are not directly testable. My research investigates the epistemic status of these principles, and in particular whether they can best be characterized as pragmatically a priori, and whether such an understanding of principles compromises our ability to know the structure of the world. My work on this subject so far has focused on two interrelated themes. First, I have explored the original motivations for developing a pragmatic account of a priori principles, as a reaction to the development of non-Euclidean geometries and the general theory of relativity. Second, I have explored the implications of this understanding of scientific principles for some traditional questions in the scientific realism debate. I am currently developing an account of scientific principles that aims to accommodate for their diverse roles in different areas of science and allow for a more interdisciplinary perspective.
Relevant works:
• Conventionalism, Structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré's Philosophy of Science
• Conventionalism About What? Where Duhem and Poincaré Part Ways
• Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and development of the relativized a priori
• Friedman's Relativized A Priori and Structural Realism

2. Non-empirical values and scientific rationality. I am interested in the precise role played by aesthetic values in scientific practice, in particular whether they are conclusive guides in theory choice, and how their use is to be justified. Aesthetic values are widely employed by practicing scientists and used to justify preferences for certain theories or hypotheses. These values are often given not only heuristic or motivational roles, but also an epistemic role; many scientists as well as philosophers claim that a beautiful theory is more likely to be true. My interest is whether aesthetic factors can be indicative of truth or empirical success and how such an epistemic link can be justified. Furthermore I am interested how scientists employing different theory values reach consensus in theory choice. I am currently developing a project exploring the role aesthetic values play in scientific decision-making and whether they can be taken to play an epistemic role in scientific methodology.
Relevant works:
• Scientific understanding and aesthetic values
• Aesthetic Values in Science
• Poincaré’s Aesthetics of Science
• Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?
• Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus
• Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice

3. Metaphysics in science. I am interested in the role of metaphysical considerations in science, the concept of evidence and how certain non-empirical hypotheses are justified in science. So far I have focused on the atomism debate, and how the atomic hypothesis became to be regarded as scientific from metaphysics. More broadly, I focus on what constitutes genuine scientific evidence, and how hypotheses can be seen to bear different status in different theoretical contexts.
Relevant works:
• Methods in Science and Metaphysics
• How Atoms Became real
• Did Perrin's Experiments Convert Poincaré to Scientific Realism?

Teaching

At the University of Cambridge, I coordinate the Writing Support Seminars, and supervise 2nd and 3rd year students in Philosophy of Science (including topics from general philosophy of science, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology and cognitive science). I am Director of Studies in Philosophy at Emmanuel College and Hughes Hall and in History and Philosophy of Science at Wolfson College and Hughes Hall.

At the MCMP I coordinated the following courses:

Aesthetics of Science +info

The A Priori in Science+info

At the University of Sydney, I coordinated the following courses:

What Is This Thing Called Science?+info

Philosophy of Science (Advanced)

Recent Activities

In 2017 I organized the conference Aesthetics of Science with Steven French, held at the University of Leeds, which was funded by an award from the British Society for Aesthetics. I wrote a recent blogpost about my work on this topic. In 2017 I became a member of the Nomination and Election Committee of the Society of History and Philosophy of Science.

In 2016 I organised the workshop First Principles in Science: Their Epistemic Status and Justification with Catherine Herfeld, and the 2016 Munich Summer School on Philosophy of Science for Female Students with Karolina Krzyżanowska and Sam Fletcher. I also ran a career workshop for female students and served as a mentor for students at LMU.

In 2015 I organised, together with Catherine Herfeld and Kristina Liefke, the Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students which took place at the MCMP in 2015 [read our blogpost about the summer school]. I was also on the programme committee of the 8th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg conference, Objectivity in Science. I previously organised the conference Conventional Principles in Science, which took place at the University of Bristol in 2011.

I am currently editing a special issue for Synthese on First Principles in Science, with Catherine Herfeld. Together with Matt Farr I edited a special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics entitled 'Conventional Principles in Science'. Read our introduction to the special issue.

I am the category editor of Varieties of Scientific Realism, Entity Realism and Convergent Realism for PhilPapers.

Other

My Erdös number is 4: Erdös→J. M. Anderson→K. Binmore→C. Paternotte→Me.

I am married to this fellow philosopher, and we're together raising our daughter Cailyn.

Publications

Books

Forthcoming. The Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding. Edited with Steven French. Routledge. Description

Journal Articles

2017. Aesthetic Values in Science. Philosophy Compass. Preprint. Abstract

2017. Poincaré's Aesthetics of Science. Synthese. Preprint. Abstract

2017. Virtues and Vices in Scientific Practice. Synthese. [With C. Paternotte.] Abstract

2015. Conventionalism about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Preprint. Abstract

2015. Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. Preprint. Abstract

2015. Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and development of the relativized a priori. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. [With M. Farr.] Preprint.

2013. Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus. Erkenntnis. [With C. Paternotte.] Preprint. Abstract

2013. Did Perrin's Experiments Convert Poincaré to Scientific Realism?. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. Preprint. Abstract

2011. ‘Good Sense’ in Context: A Response to Kidd. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Abstract

2011. Friedman's Relativized A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Preprint.
Abstract

2010. Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Preprint. Abstract

Book Chapters

Forthcoming. Methods in Science and Metaphysics. [With M. Farr.] Commissioned for Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, ed. James Miller and Ricki Bliss.
Abstract

2014. Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice? In Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Ed. Abrol Fairweather), Synthese Library. Abstract

Edited Journal Special Issues

Forthcoming. First Principles in Science. Special issue of Synthese. [With C. Herfeld]

2015. Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and development of the relativized a priori. Special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. [With M. Farr]

Book Reviews

2017. David Stump’s Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science: Alternative Interpretations of the A Priori. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.

2014. John Wright's Explaining Science's Success. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

2013. Steven French and Juha Saatsi's Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Science and Education.

Works in progress

Beauty, Truth and Understanding. [Commissioned]

Pragmatic values in science. [Commissioned]

Talks

Forthcoming

How atoms became realVenues

Beauty, truth and understandingVenues

Presented

Pragmatic values in scienceVenues

How atoms became realVenues

Beauty, truth and understandingVenues

Aesthetic Values in Science. Venues

The role and justification of aesthetic values in science. Venues

Mach, Duhem and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge. Venues

The evolution of constitutive principles. Venues

The A Priori in Science. Venues

Poincaré's aesthetics of science. Venues

Duhem’s solution to theory choice. Venues

Conventionalism about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways. Venues

Conventionalism, Structuralism and Neo-Kantianism in Poincaré's Philosophy of Science. Venues

Does Duhem's 'Good Sense' Make Sense?. (With Cedric Paternotte.) Venues

Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice? Venues

Is the Relativized A Priori Incompatible with Scientific Realism?
Venues

Can the Realist Solve the Problem of Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence? Venues

More Worries for Structural Realism: a Dilemma from the Relativized A Priori. Venues